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"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation."1 The maintenance of the "rule
of law" must not shackle a government in such a manner as to render it
unable to protect itself in the face of actual or threatened emergencies or
other national security threats. The events of 9/11 have caused many
nations to rethink the contours of human rights law. The exigencies of
modern terrorism affect our conceptions of civil liberties, and provide a
daunting task for lawmakers who must preserve their nation's security and
simultaneously stand tall as defenders of human rights. The fear resulting
from the exigencies of modern terrorism is that human rights standards will
suffer if there are no adequate safeguards in place to protect them.
Paradoxically, a liberal democracy will cease to exist, and will
become something far different, if national security is redefined as being
primary to civil liberties and such liberties are seen as merely getting in the
way of security. Aharon Barak, President of the Israeli Supreme Court,
eloquently explained: "This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means
are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open
before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand."2
The right to strike is a human right subject to derogations under
international law.3 The right to strike is the "necessary and desirable
counterpart" to the combination of power on the employers' side, "if the
battle is to be carried out in a fair and equal way.",4 That is, by suppressing
the right to strike, the government "puts the workers at the mercy of their
f L.L.M. 2004, The London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D. 2003,
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. This Article is dedicated to my wife
Nicole Marie Crum, who has endured nearly every draft of every paper I have written for
nearly eight years.
1. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
2. H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel (Sept. 6, 1999), reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 1471, 1488 (1999).
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes., J., dissenting).
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employers. 5  Also, the right to strike is "closely associated with
democratic concepts of freedom,"' and essential if workers' freedom of
association is to be recognized.7
In 1914, the United States exempted labor from antitrust laws, because
"[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."
8
Thus, nearly a century ago, the United States explicitly recognized that
labor law could not be set aside as an economic issue; rather, "it should be
a consideration before, not among, purely economic factors." 9
Nevertheless, developments in American labor law bring into doubt the
importance of the human dimension.' ° American labor law began as a
guarantee of core social justice issues for workers," yet it has strayed to the
point that on the NLRA's fiftieth anniversary, the House Committee on
Education and Labor's Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations
concluded: "[1]abor law has failed."' 12 If labor law has failed during times
of peace and prosperity, one must especially question how the laws
governing emergencies have fared, since people are often quick to dismiss
others' rights in times of threats that are both perceived and real. 3
There have been multiple studies analyzing the Taft-Hartley
emergency injunctions, but these studies have remained within the confines
of American law.' 4 This Article seeks to build upon these prior studies by
adding an international element to the equation. This Article provides an
in-depth analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act emergency injunction, which
gives the President power to enjoin a "threatened or actual strike or lockout
affecting an entire industry. . . , [that] will, if permitted to occur or to
continue, imperil the national health or safety". 5  The emergency
injunction fails to adequately protect the right to strike, and there is no
adequate protection for preventing post-9/11 national security concerns
5. OTTO KAHN-FREUND & BOB HEPPLE, LAWS AGAINST STRIKES 8 (Fabian Research
Series No. 305, 1972).
6. Edwin E. Witte, Industrial Conflict in Periods of National Emergency, in
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 428, 438 (Arthur Kornhauser et al. eds., 1954).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. THE CLAYTON ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
9. John C. Knapp, Note, The Boundaries of the ILO: A Labor Rights Argument for
Institutional Cooperation, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 369, 374 (2003).
10. See James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and
Moral Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 482-86 (2002) (describing the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act).
11. See id. at 480-82 (discussing the Wagner Act's guarantees of social justice).
12. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC.
AND LAB., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
WORKERS 1 (Comm. Print 1984).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04.
14. See, e.g., infra notes 25, 95, 105-06.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (2000).
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from being used as pretenses to enjoin otherwise lawful strikes.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of American labor law,
explaining where and how the Taft-Hartley emergency injunctions fit in.
Part II is a case study of the 2002 West Coast port closure, the first time in
almost thirty years that a president invoked the emergency injunction.
Lastly, Part III assesses the emergency injunction in light of International
Labor Organization (ILO) jurisprudence, concluding that the injunction is
contrary to workers' freedom of association, because it unjustifiably
restricts a worker's right to strike.
I. NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
This section describes and analyzes the Taft-Hartley Act emergency
injunction. First, the legislative background, policy, and statutory
procedure are discussed. Second, the jurisprudence developed by the
courts is analyzed.
A. Statutory Scheme
There are a plethora of statutory provisions defining the contours of
collective employment relationships in both federal and state law,
separating public from private, and creating different classifications of
employees. 6 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 7 covers most
private sector employers in the United States. The NLRA covers all
employees, except for those specifically excluded from its coverage.
1 8
Thus, agricultural laborers, domestic servants, independent contractors,
supervisors, employees subject to the Railway Labor Act, and public
employees (whether they are federal, state, or local) have no protection
under the NLRA.1 9 Employees governed by the NLRA are subject to the
Taft-Hartley emergency injunctions.2 °
16. Unlike British law, the terms "employee" and "worker" are not terms of art, and
retain their plain meaning.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). The most important amendments to the NLRA are
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). The original Act is known as the
Wagner Act.
18. Jared S. Gross, Recognition of Labor Unions in a Comparative Context: Has the
United Kingdom Entered a New Era?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 357, 364-65 (2003).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). For judicial and agency interpretations and definitions of the
excluded classes of employees, see Gross, supra note 18, at 365 n.53.
20. See supra note 17. The Taft Hartley emergency injunctions were created as an
amendment to the NLRA, known as the Labor-Management-Relations Act, commonly
called the Taft-Hartley Act. The specific provisions governing national emergency disputes
are found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (2000).
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1. Background Statutory Landscape
Congress provided a federal right to strike in the NLRA, and in
choosing the wording of the statute, selected "language to forewarn courts
not to interfere in labor disputes."'', The relevant language states that
nothing in the NLRA, "except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right."22  The Norris-LaGuardia Act23 divests the federal courts of the
jurisdiction to enjoin most strikes,24 with narrow exceptions, 25 but this Act
does not affect the ability of state courts to enjoin strikes.26 However, state
injunctions rarely present the "problem of judicial interference in
substantive aspects of labor negotiations.,,2' Rather, conduct that endangers
public safety and welfare, such as violence, coercion, and intimidation,
may be enjoined.8 Such violent conduct falls within the scope of
traditional state police powers, and is not preempted by the NLRA's
preemption of the field.29 Moreover, these injunctions do not address
peaceful striking.30
The enactment of the NLRA provided substantive collective
bargaining rights and preemption of state regulation of labor disputes for
the first time.3' The two main premises of the NLRA, as it was enacted in
1935, which provided employees with an unabridged right to strike were:
21. Michael H. LeRoy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction: National
Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ.
L. REV. 63, 64 (2001).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 163.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2000).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 113; see also Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 716 (1982) (discussing the application of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act).
25. Federal courts may enjoin strikes when they arise during the existence of an
agreement not to strike. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 237-38 (1970). This decision was narrowed six years later in Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., where the Supreme Court stated that Boys Markets only applied
where collective bargaining agreements had mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures. 428 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1976).
26. See LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 96 (describing the Supreme Court's view
of enjoining strikes under the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
27. Id. at 96-97.
28. Id. at 97 n.197.
29. See Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 749 (1942).
30. See LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 97-98 n.198 (citing cases which involve
peaceful picketing).
31. Id. at99.
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(1) non-interference by the government when employers and unions
negotiate terms and conditions of employment; and (2) equality of
bargaining power.32 The economic weapons of both employers and unions
were left unfettered, providing an economic incentive to bargain in good
faith.33 Justice Brennan explained that good faith bargaining and economic
pressure exist "side by side." 34 Overall, except for the limited types of
injunctions mentioned above,35 there was no ability to intervene in lawful
strike action in the NLRA. This changed in 1947 with the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act.36  Through the Taft-Hartley emergency injunction,
Congress moved away from its model of unfettered private collective
bargaining, to include both presidential intervention and mobilization of
public opinion to end industrial disputes.37
2. Policy of the Taft-Hartley Emergency Strike Provisions
Congress expressly acknowledged its preference for private settlement
of labor disputes by "the processes of conference and collective bargaining
between employers and the representatives of their employees. 3 s To help
facilitate private settlement, Congress provided for "adequate governmental
facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and
encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach
and maintain agreements".39 Congress acknowledged the need to protect
the national health or safety whenever it is imperiled by a strike or lockout,
and under the Taft-Hartley Act, provided a means to enjoin even the "most
peaceful strike... during the eighty day period if the Court finds it runs
counter to the public interest and affects the national welfare."4 °
Consequently, the "[g]overnment's right to enjoin the strike or lockout does
not hinge on violation of federal law, breach of agreement, which union or
unions represent the men, which union called the strike, who is the
employer, or the merits of the unresolved controversy.'
32. Id. at 99 nn.200-01 (2001); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States,
361 U.S. 39, 62-77 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the purposes of the NLRA).
33. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 99.
34. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,488-89 (1960).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
36. See supra note 17.
37. S. REP. No. 80-15, at 15 (1947).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000); see Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. v.
ZCON Builders, 96 F.3d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting limited review of arbitrator's
decisions).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 17 1(b).
40. United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y
1953).
41. Id.
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3. Taft-Hartley Act Emergency Strike Provisions
The national emergency provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act authorize
the President to adopt emergency measures whenever, "a threatened or
actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry... will, if permitted to
occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety. 42 First, the
President may appoint a board of inquiry to investigate and report the facts
and the positions of the parties.43 This report "shall include a statement of
the facts with respect to the dispute, including each party's statement of its
position", but the board of inquiry has no power to make any
recommendations in the report.44 The board of inquiry has broad powers to
subpoena witnesses and documents in order to prepare the report.45 The
President must also file a copy of this report with the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and make the contents of the report
available to the public.46
The President, upon receipt of the board of inquiry's report, may
direct the Attorney General to petition the appropriate federal district court
to issue an injunction to prevent or stop a lockout or strike.47 If the district
court finds that the actual or threatened strike or lockout:
(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged
in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several States or with foreign nations,
or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and (ii) if
permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health
or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or
lockout, or the continuing thereof, and to make such other orders
48as may be appropriate.
Thus, in order to have an injunction granted, the government must be able
to convince the court that the threatened lockout or strike affects an "entire
industry or substantial part thereof' and that there is a threat to "national
health or safety."
The provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable,49 and
injunctions, or denial thereof, are appealable.5° If the injunction is granted,
42. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (2000).
43. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. at 265.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 176.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 177(c) (2000).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 176.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (2000).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 178(b).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 178(c).
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an approximately eighty-day "cooling-off' period begins, whereby parties
are intended to peacefully resolve their differences.5 ' During the pendency
of the "cooling-off' period, it is the "duty of the parties... to make every
effort to adjust and settle their differences, with the assistance of the
[FMCS].'52 However, "[n]either party shall be under any duty to accept, in
whole or in part, any proposal of settlement made by the [FMCS]. 53
During the pendency of the injunction, the terms and conditions in
existence before the dispute arose continue. 4
The granting of an injunction also triggers the board of inquiry to
reconvene.55 At the end of a sixty-day period, unless the dispute has been
settled by that time, "the board of inquiry shall report to the President the
current position of the parties and the efforts which have been made for
settlement, and shall include a statement by each party of its position and a
statement of the employer's last offer of settlement.' 56 Then, the President
makes this report available to the public, and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), within the next fifteen days, "shall take a secret ballot of
the employees of each employer involved in the dispute on the question of
whether they wish to accept the final offer of settlement made by their
employer. '57 After the NLRB certifies the vote to the Attorney General, it
must petition the district court to discharge the injunction.5 8 At this point,
if the parties have not come to an agreement, the President's only course of
action is to submit a report to Congress and make recommendations for
legislative action.59
B. Jurisprudence of the Emergency Injunction
A president has invoked the Taft-Hartley emergency injunction thirty-
five times, and the 2002 West Coast port closure was the first time a
president sought to use it since 1978 when President Carter attempted to
stop striking mineworkers during the middle of an energy crisis.60 There
have only been two occasions where a court has refused to enjoin a strike:
the 1978 coal miner's strike, and a 1971 strike, where the court refused to
51. United States v. Avco Corp., Lycoming Div., 270 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D. Conn.
1967).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 179(a) (2000).
53. Id.
54. E.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Boeing Co., 315 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1963).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 179(b).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 180 (2000).
59. Id.
60. Sue Kirchhoff, Coast Ports Reopened as Bush Intervenes, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9,
2002, at A 1; see also infra text accompanying note 91.
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grant an injunction over a dispute involving 200 grain elevator
employees.6'
1. Judicial Interpretation of Emergency Injunctions
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the issuance of an
emergency injunction in United Steelworkers of America v. United States.
62
The Court affirmed the lower court, permitting a blanket injunction.63
Justice Douglas, dissenting, described the deferential approach to granting
injunctions, noting that federal courts became a mere "rubber stamp for the
President."64 He believed that the President wrongly construed "health," as
found in 29 U.S.C. section 178(a)(2), to have a broad definition
encompassing "the material well-being or public welfare of the Nation."6'5
The statute creating emergency injunctions was intentionally narrowly
drafted, despite some senators and representatives' desire to "outlaw strikes
'in utilities and key Nation-wide industries' in order to protect the 'public
welfare.' ' '66  Moreover, the version of the bill eventually adopted
specifically excluded terms such as "public welfare" or "national interest,"
because such terms were seen as too indefinite and were capable of
covering much more than health or safety.67
Relying on the legislative record and the sour history of pre-Taft-
Hartley Act labor injunction abuses, Justice Douglas concluded: "[t]o read
'welfare' into 'health' gives that word such a vast reach that we should do
it only under the most compelling necessity.... [W]e should hesitate to
conclude that Congress meant to restore the use of the injunction in labor
disputes whenever that broad and all-inclusive concept of the public
welfare is impaired. 6 8  In fact, Justice Douglas believed the Court was
abdicating its constitutional duty, becoming the "President's
Administrative Assistant" such that it would "rise to no higher level than an
IBM machine."69
Justice Douglas's observations were indeed correct, as various federal
courts have left their mark on history by all too often acting "upon
assumptions rather than findings of fact. 7 ° Justice Douglas was likely not
impressed by the Supreme Court's notion that the board of inquiry would
61. Kirchhoff, supra note 60; see also infra text accompanying note 85.
62. 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
63. Id. at 61.
64. Id. at 71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 93 CONG. REc. A1035).
67. Id. at 65-66, n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 67-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 110.
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be the location of serious and reaching fact-finding. 71 Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's statement, the boards could not possibly have undertaken
in depth studies of the disputes before making their reports.72 For example,
in United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, the court made its
decision on a series of affidavits, without providing the union an
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants or to challenge the information in
the affidavits. 73 Also, the court annualized all of the financial data when
there was no evidentiary basis for assuming the dispute would last that
long.74
Interestingly, the court saw nothing wrong with the fact that the board
of inquiry took only one day to investigate, and was able to create its report
several hours after the parties provided presentations. In United States v.
Avco, 7 6 the district court granted an injunction, taking the President simply
at his word, parroting the government's petition, which was itself based on
a report that the board of inquiry produced in less than forty-eight hours.77
In yet another case, a federal district court saw no error when the board of
inquiry delegated all of its functions to one member of the board, and
denied the union a chance to provide evidence contrary to the government's
position."
One legacy of the 1959 Steelworkers case was that extremely broad
blanket injunctions would not be sufficiently scrutinized. Justice Douglas
noted that the statute provided only that the district court has the
jurisdiction to enjoin a strike or work stoppage. 79 Therefore, there is no
need to "enjoin 100% of the strikers when only 1% or 5% or 10% of them
are engaged in acts that imperil the national 'safety."' 8 The courts' powers
have been interpreted as to preclude the possibility of applying the
injunction selectively so that enough mills, ports, etc., can be left outside of
the injunction's ambit so as to permit work vital to national health or
safety, while minimizing restrictions on the right to strike.81 It may be
possible that courts, after undergoing an in depth inquiry of the facts, will
come to the conclusion that for a particular labor dispute, a broad blanket
71. United Steelworkers of Am., 361 U.S. at 41.
72. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 112.
73. United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 293 F. Supp 97, 99-102 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
74. Id. at 100.
75. Id. at 103.
76. 270 F. Supp. 665 (D. Conn. 1967).
77. Id. at 670-71.
78. United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 849, 854-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
79. United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 70 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. at 70 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 74-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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injunction is the only recourse to avert imperiling the "national health or
safety."82 Yet, no such inquiries are performed, so this issue remains open.
Another legacy of the 1959 Steelworkers case was the broad scope
given to defining the "national health or safety." Justice Douglas believed
that the "national health or safety" was limited to "safeguarding the heating
of homes, the delivery of milk, the protection of hospitals, and the like,
' 8 3
but his view did not win the day. Other courts have expounded on the
definition of "national health or safety," concluding that it must be given a
broad construction." This broad scope finally received some boundaries
when President Nixon's request to enjoin an extremely small-scale strike
was rejected in United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
418.85 The government sought an injunction based solely on economic
grounds, and was unable to provide the court with a single instance "of any
decision that has granted an injunction based solely on national economic
interest without considerations of national defense or physical health. 8 6
The court emphasized that solely fiscal harm is insufficient for an
injunction, explaining:
Some harm or threat of injury is regrettably a natural
indispensable element of any strike; however, it is the very
essence of the only weapon labor can aim at management. But
such injury remains a question of degree. The closing of a small
factory somewhere in the United States, due to the striking of ten
employees may injure the economy, if we stretch the meaning of
injury to absurd proportions, by decreasing the Gross National
Product by $25,000 and might add to the balance of trade deficit
by that same amount. Yet, no one would venture that this is an
injury of such consequential dimensions as to necessitate
governmental intervention. On the other hand, the fact that only
two-or two hundred-workers are on strike is not of itself
dispositive of whether a strike is critical or not. A qualitative as
well as quantitative approach must be taken; it is not how many
do it but rather what they do. If two men manufacture the firing
pins for all of this country's rifles, quite obviously their refusal to
work is of enormous significance despite their insignificant
number.87
82. Id. at 76 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. E.g., United States v. Portland Longshoremen's Benevolent Soc'y, Local No. 861,
336 F. Supp. 504, 505 (D. ME. 1971).
85. 335 F. Supp. 501, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
86. Id. at 507.
87. Id. at 509.
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The government appealed the district court's order, but was unable to
convince the Court of Appeals to reverse the lower court.88 However, the
appellate court broadened the definition of "national health," stating:
The health of the nation is a concept which includes more than
the physical well-being of its citizenry.... In other words, if the
economic impact of the strike is so great that the national
economy is threatened, in my opinion its health is "imperiled"
within the meaning of the Act even if adequate provision may
have been made to protect the physical health of the citizenry.89
Thus, economic harm caused by a strike will suffice to bring about an
injunction if the "essential well-being of the economy" is threatened as a
result of the strike.90 When President Carter's petition for an injunction
was rejected in 1978, the court found that there was insufficient "evidence
of irreparable harm to the national health or safety of the United States."91
Needless to say, the government's evidence must be severely lacking for a
President to fall at obtaining an injunction.
2. Reviewing the History of the Emergency Injunctions: Were They
Necessary?
The previous subsection demonstrated that courts do not require much
evidence from the President when deciding whether to order an injunction
or not, and this low evidentiary threshold creates a risk that emergency
injunctions may be sought when the nation is not under serious threat. Ray
Marshall, President Carter's Secretary of Labor, stated that the purpose of
the injunction was not to avert a national emergency;92 rather, it was meant
to be a "catalyst to bring about the resumption of productive collective
bargaining negotiations." 93 That use of injunctions is nothing less than a
perversion of presidential authority, and certainly not what the drafters of
the Taft-Hartley Act had in mind.94 Two studies undertaken by the United
States Department of Labor (DOL)95 concluded that the economic
88. United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 418, 66 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
12,238 (7th Cir. 1971).
89. Id. at 22,836.
90. Id.
91. United States v. United Mine Workers, 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,465, at 17,873
(D.D.C. 1978).
92. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 134 n.409.
93. Id. (quoting Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at E-2 (Mar. 17, 1978)).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
95. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY: A
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consequences of strikes were seriously exaggerated.96 Consequently, it
may be the case that President Carter was not the only president to make
disingenuous use of the injunction on pretenses. Fortunately, the court in
United States v. United Mine Workers called President Carter's bluff and
did not grant the injunction.
The 1961 Study concluded that the economic impact of strikes on the
national economy was "usually seriously exaggerated,9 7 contradicting the
judicial fact-findings made by the courts in strikes affected by injunctions.98
The 1961 Study criticized the courts for not taking account of factors such
as "seasonal and cyclical forces," the general industry practice of working
below capacity, the impact of inventory accumulations, and the levels at
which the "economy will be seriously hurt."99  The 1961 Study also
questioned the government's early intervention, noting: "[the] imposition
of neutrals, as distinct from a situation in which parties voluntarily seek the
assistance of neutrals, would appear more likely to intensify conflict than to
aid in the resolution of issues."' ° Moreover, the Study argued, government
involvement served to prolong disputes.' ° The Study also noted that rather
than listening to union arguments, the courts drafted broad injunctions
despite the fact that "[a]n injunction seems to be a sufficiently flexible
device to be used at a single plant or group of plants within one
industry."' 2
Taft-Hartley injunctions often are unsuccessful at bringing disputes to
speedy settlements. Out of all the strikes that were enjoined from 1947
through 2001, four were not halted, seven continued after the injunction
was discharged, and nine continued after the cooling-off period ended.'0 3
Overall, settlement was not achieved in thirty percent of enjoined strikes.'
The "final offer" votes have fared worse, as workers have never voted to
accept the final offer, and "the vote has only the effect of solidifying the
parties' differences... and prolonging the strike by making compromise
more difficult,"' 0 5 often causing "emergency pause a time for heating up
STUDY OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (Jan. 1961) [hereinafter
1961 STUDY]; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IMPACT OF LONGSHORE STRIKES ON THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY (Jan. 1970) [hereinafter 1970 STUDY].
96. 1961 STUDY, supra note 95, at 48; 1970 STUDY, supra note 95, at 4.
97. 1961 STUDY, supra note 95, at 48.
98. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 118.
99. 1961 STUDY, supra note 95, at 49.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 207.
102. Id. at 224.
103. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 130.
104. Id.
105. Frederick J. Lewis, Proposals for Change in the Taft-Hartley Emergency
Procedures: A Critical Appraisal, 40 TENN. L. REv. 689, 703 (1973); see also WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 195-96 (1993) (stating that "every single last offer has
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rather than cooling off... [as the] bargaining position of the parties
becomes frozen as they posture for advantage."'' 6  The drafters of the
emergency injunction assumed "that the rank-and-file in many instances
are more reasonable than their leaders," but both leaders and the rank-and-
file see the ballots as "a vote of confidence for union leadership."' 07 This
fact leads management to hold something in reserve when drafting its last
offer, because it knows that there will be more give-and-take in further
rounds of bargaining or later offers once the strike resumes.'0 8
Management has less incentive to bargain since it knows that the
government will intervene, and unions respond by not bargaining in good
faith as well; consequently, collective bargaining is hurt, and the dispute is
exacerbated.' 9
Courts generally do not consider union arguments regarding partial
operation of plants and industry, even though a Department of Commerce
study concluded that it is "technically and economically feasible to
meet.., needs through partial operation.""0 The conclusion of the 1961
Study was that "the consequences of steel strikes to the public need not
cause alarm and are typically exaggerated, [but] the crisis atmosphere
which is created can outweigh a logical appraisal."'' l  The 1970 Study also
concluded that the economic impact of Longshoremen strikes was
exaggerated." 2 LeRoy and Johnson provided two tables contrasting the
courts' and the Department of Labor's assessments of "National
Emergency Risks" by Steel Strikes and Longshore Strikes," 3 and
concluded that: "Courts assumed worst-case strike scenarios for fuel
shortages, forced layoffs, and reduced economic output. In contrast, DOL
reports noted that strikes are almost always foreseeable, which prompts
stockpiling of inventory. This preparation reduces the impact of large
strikes."' 4 Consequently, emergency injunctions, while noble in purpose,
have become something far different than the drafters intended them to
be," 5 denying workers their right to strike when the national health or
safety is not under threat.
been voted down").
106. William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421, 1482 (1972).
107. Id.; GOULD IV, supra note 105, at 195.
108. Gould, supra note 106, at 1483.
109. See id. at 1482-83 (referring to the tendency of parties to rely on emergency strike
provisions to "save the day").
110. 1961 STUDY, supra note 95, at 48.
111. Id. at 17.
112. 1970 STUDY, supra note 95, at 4.
113. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 120-21 tbls.2A & 2B.
114. ld. at 122.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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II. MOST RECENT TAFT-HARTLEY INJUNCTION: OCTOBER 2002 WEST
COAST PORT CLOSURE
President Bush successfully obtained a Taft-Hartley emergency
injunction, sending the locked-out International Longshore and Warehouse
Union (ILWU) on America's West Coast back to work.'16 The dispute
involved the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), which represents eighty
shipping lines and port operators on the West Coast, affecting twenty-nine
ports on America's West Coast and 10,500 members of the ILWU.117 This
section will first describe the facts surrounding the period leading up to the
injunction that ended ILWU's lockout. Second, it will analyze the court's
order granting the injunction. Lastly, it will examine the dispute in light of
the issues discussed in Part I; concluding that the usage of the Taft-Hartley
injunction in this case, while arguably legitimate, left many questions and
should not be seen as a triumph of the statutory procedure. Rather, this
recent experience lends further credence to the need to change the
injunction process.
Lockouts are different than strikes, but this industrial dispute must be
read in the same light as a denial of the right to strike. The lockout was the
PMA's response to an alleged slowdown by the ILWU, and the language
that the administration used framed the dispute as being the workers' fault.
An unnamed Labor Department official stated: "[tlhe way these guys have
negotiated, they make demands and when they don't get what they want,
they engage in slowdowns. ' .. The official continued: "[t]his time, before
the normal historic pattern was allowed to unfold, we went in to assess the
situation.... It would be irresponsible to walt for the meltdown."
1'1 9
However, what the official meant by "meltdown" is unclear, as the ILWU
has not gone on strike since 1971, demonstrating that the historical pattern
is that this union leaned towards settlement.12° Still, the discourse of work
stoppage regarded the workers as the party that was out of line, and the
injunction prevented the workers from trying to counteract the lockout.
Therefore, the issues surrounding the right to strike remain relevant here,
despite the source of the work stoppage.
116. The President Takes Action to Protect America's Economy and American Jobs, The
White House Office of Communications, 2002 WL 31239930 (Oct. 7, 2002).
117. United States v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1008, 1010 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
118. Nancy Cleeland, White House Signals It Will Move to Forestall West Coast Port
Strike, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at Al.
119. Id.
120. Marla Dickerson, Lawmakers Blast Feds on Port Talks, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002,
at C1.
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A. Background of the Dispute
The dispute involved new technology that the PMA wanted to
introduce, and whether the new jobs would be held by union members.' 2'
Contract negotiations began in May 2002, but began to deteriorate during
the summer. 122 The ILWU had been working without a contract since
September 1, 2002, and on September 29, 2002 the PMA, accusing the
ILWU of engaging in a slowdown during contract negotiations, locked out
the workers. 123 The union denied that it was engaging in a work slowdown,
arguing that it was taking safety precautions in light of record cargo
volumes and increased accidents, including five deaths in as many
months.124 Through the Labor Department, the Bush administration asked
both sides on October 8, 2002 to extend the contract for thirty days. The
union accepted the offer, but the PMA refused.'25 Within a few hours of
the PMA refusing to extend the contract, President Bush sought the
injunction.
2 6
B. Court Proceeding
Prior to commencement of the action for the Taft-Hartley injunction,
President Bush appointed a board of inquiry, which concluded on the
following day that the PMA and the ILWU would not resolve the port
shutdown in a reasonable time. 127 The government did not have a hard time
meeting the first prong of the statutory test, demonstrating to the court that
the work stoppage affected "an entire industry or a substantial part
thereof."'' 28 According to the Secretary of Transportation, the twenty-nine
affected West Coast ports are "crucial gateways to America's trade routes
to Asia and the Pacific.' 29 These ports handle over fifty percent of the
United States' containerized imports and exports, totaling 300 billion
dollars annually. 3° Moreover, the Secretary of Commerce considered the
121. David Bacon, Unions Fear "War on Terror" Will Overcome Right to Strike, INTER
PRESS SERV., Aug. 9, 2002.
122. George Raine, Year in Review; People in crisis; Containing the Damage, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 31, 2002, at BI.
123. William B. Gould IV, Better Laws to Settle the Port Labor Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2002, at A39; William Booth, W. Coast Shipping Contract is Set; Deal on
Technology Ends Bitter Dispute That Closed Ports, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
124. Raine, supra note 122.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Unites States v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
128. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 178(a)(i) (2002)).
129. Id. (citing Mineta Decl. 9).
130. Id. (citing Mineta Dec]. 9, 11).
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twenty-nine affected ports as being critically important to the United
States' maritime industry.' 3' Neither the PMA nor the ILWU disputed
these facts.
132
While it was unnecessary to demonstrate that a prolonged work
stoppage imperiled both national safety and national health, the
government convinced the court ,that both were imperiled, which satisfied
the second prong of the statutory test and secured the injunction. 133 The
American economy was in the midst of an economic recovery, and
Secretary of Commerce Evans stated that the stoppage came at a "critical
time" for the United States economy, involving "critical inventory-
building.., when retailers are stocking for the end-of-year holidays."'
34
Secretary Evans further concluded that key industries such as transportation
and agriculture would be substantially harmed, and the overall rate of
growth of real Gross Domestic Product would decline. 135  The work
stoppage was said to have created a "substantial transportation bottleneck,"
and substantial spoilage of perishable goods.1 36 Secretary of Labor Chao
stated: "over the entire fourth quarter of 2002, employment on average will
be reduced by approximately 140,000 jobs.' 37
Secretary Chao also stated that the work stoppage had "directly
resulted in the unemployment of approximately 12,500 persons, including
not only ILWU workers but also some management and support
employees.' ' 38  This statement was particularly interesting, as those
employees involved in the dispute should not be counted for purposes of
determining the loss to the economy. First, the losses are a result of PMA
engaging in a lockout, and whether it was in response to a slowdown is
irrelevant. Second, and more important, the emergency injunction is
predicated on the theory that the public is being harmed by the actions of
the private actors to the extent that intervention in private negotiation is
necessary, and supercedes either parties' right to engage in economic
warfare.
1 3 9
Regarding the threat to national safety, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
argued the lockout was disrupting "the transport of essential military cargo
and jeopardizes one of the Department of Defense's core missions-
equipping and sustaining the military at a time when it is prosecuting a
131. Id. at 1010 (citing Evans Decl. 4).
132. Id. at 1010.
133. Id. at 1010-15.
134. Id. at 1011 (citing Evans Decl. 9H 12, 13).
135. Id. (citing Evans Decl. 71 12, 13).
136. Id. at 1012, 1013.
137. Id. at 1011 (citing Chao Decl. 91 6-7).
138. Id. (citing Chao Decl. U 6-7).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
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global war on terrorism.' 4 °  Secretary Rumsfeld explained: "[the
Department of Defense] relies on commercial ships in common carrier
service operating from commercial terminals to carry [goods and supplies]
necessary for the support of the armed forces.'' Moreover, the
Department of Defense relies on "just-in-time" deliveries as they are the
most efficient means to conduct business, and the overall impact of the
work stoppage has disrupted "the flow of essential military cargo.', 142 Also,
the ports need to be left open in the event of unforeseen developments that
require immediate attention. 43 The ILWU and PMA provisionally agreed
to move military shipments, so as not to impede the war effort, but
Secretary Rumsfeld stated that such an agreement would be impossible to
carry out in a manner that would meet the Department of Defense's needs,
because military supplies are often not separately marked and
distinguishable from commercial supplies.' 44 Overall, the administration
argued that a port shutdown or slowdown endangered the war on
terrorism,141 which was sufficient to convince the court that national safety
was imperiled.
The court rejected the ILWU's argument that the invocation of the
emergency junction was the product of collusion as speculation, explaining
that the court's focus was whether the government could meet the statutory
preconditions, "not on the politics behind its decision.' 46 The ILWU also
argued that the lockout was on the verge of collapse. However, the court
was not swayed, and pointed out that the government's "powerful
showing" was enough, and anything else would be mere guesswork, which
was not the duty of the court. 147 Along with requiring the ports to open and
halting the lockout, the court also enjoined the union from striking and
engaging in slowdowns under its authority "to make such other orders as
may be appropriate. '
C. Assessing the Lockout and the Bush Administration's Actions
Despite the Bush Administration's expressions of neutrality, the union
saw the federal intervention as simply part of a pattern of actions intended
140. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
141. Id. (citing Rumsfeld Decl. 3).
142. Id. (citing Rumsfeld Decl. 3).
143. Id. at 1014 (citing Rumsfeld Decl. N 4, 28).
144. Id. (citing Rumsfeld Decl. 4).
145. David Armstrong, Ports Called Key Element in U.S. Security; West Coast Crucial
Link in Wartime Supply Chain, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2002, at G 1.
146. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
147. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959)).
148. Id. at 1015-16 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 178(a)(ii) (2000)).
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to weaken unions.1 49  The union did not see neutrality, as prior to the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, Tom Ridge, Director of
Homeland Security, suggested that: "any job slow-down or strike would be
viewed as a threat to national security."'"5 In the months leading up to the
lockout, the administration made it clear that they were prepared to
intervene if any strike occurred, using the term "strike" despite the reality
that employers can resort to a lockout.15" ' Both Ridge and Secretary Chao
told the ILWU how the administration was ready to prevent any strike.1
5 2
The PMA was not entirely ignored, however, as the administration
encouraged it to offer more medical benefits to the union, and the PMA
explained that it was being pressured too.'53 Law Professor and former
Chairman of the NLRB, William B. Gould IV, concluded that "[w]hatever
the facts about the slowdown, the lockout is a tactic aimed at bringing in
the Bush administration through Taft-Hartley.
Leading up to the invocation of the emergency injunction, the ability
of both parties to collectively bargain in good faith started to break down,
reflecting a trend that has been identified by both scholars and the DOL.
The union argued that the employers group was "not negotiating
seriously ... because it is counting on federal intervention if a strike is
called.' 55 Union leaders also said that they were unable to bargain in good
faith, because Bush's pledge to intervene cut off the possibility of them
using the strike. 5 6 As a result of the threatened intervention, the PMA was
also prevented from negotiating fairly, because as many union members
believed, "it knows the government 'has their backs."" 57 From the union's
viewpoint, they wanted to work, but were kept out. AFL-CIO Secretary-
Treasurer Richard Trumka explained: "[t]his is the first time.. . a president
149. Cleeland, supra note 118.
There have been multiple instances which the labor movement argues have given
them reason to believe that the Bush administration was anti-union. For example, "the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") was delayed for several months
due to the Bush Administration's refusal to accept collective bargaining rights for DHS
workers." Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the "Un-American" Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1725 (2004). Recently, Secretary of Education Roderick R.
Paige characterized the National Education Association, one of the largest labor unions in
the United States, as a "terrorist organization." Amy Goldstein, Paige Calls NEA a
'Terrorist' Group, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, at A19.
150. Stephanie Salter, The ILWU Shoves Back, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 2002, at D4.
151. Bacon, supra note 121.
152. Id.
153. Cleeland, supra note 118.
154. Peter G. Gosselin, Taft-Hartley Act is Ultimate Weapon, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002,
at C1.
155. Cleeland, supra note 118.
156. Paul T. Rosynsky, Unions Tell Bush to Back Off in Labor Talks, TRI-VALLEY
HERALD, Aug. 13, 2002.
157. Id.
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has let an employer lock out workers in an extended quest to undermine the
workers' union-creating a phony crisis-and then reward that employer's
action with government intervention."'"8
The unions also saw President Bush's actions as indicative of bias, as
the White House provided private briefings for business lobbyists seeking
presidential intervention,' 59 without extending the same meetings to the
ILWU or the AFL-CIO. 60 Rather, the White House had top Bush aide Karl
Rove and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. call Teamsters President
James P. Hoffa and AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney. 161 While these
phone calls cannot be dismissed, there is a difference between meeting with
individuals in private and making a telephone call. The cause of the
breakdown in negotiations is impossible to pinpoint, nevertheless, the
negotiations had reached a historic low. Bob McEllrath, an ILWU vice
president, commented: "I've negotiated these contracts for the West Coast
since '93, and I've never seen this before.' 62  The low level of trust
between the parties was also apparent at the beginning of the federal
mediation, when the ILWU president walked out upon the arrival of the
PMA president, who arrived escorted by two armed guards, which he
claimed were necessary because of death threats.
163
Whether or not the union was correct in arguing that the Bush
administration was biased, or whether the PMA was stalling and waiting
for intervention, the union was nonetheless in fear. This fear may have
forestalled an earlier settlement, as the union admitted they could not
bargain in good faith while they were under the shadow of federal
intervention 64 Nevertheless, this example proves what the 1961 and 1970
Studies as well as various academics concluded: the threat of intervention
may often have adverse consequences on collective bargaining, 65 because
once the ability or desire to bargain in good faith is lost, little progress can
be made. The long history of governmental exaggeration during alleged
"crises" gives credence to unions' views of injunctions being "one-sided
relief, inequitable from the union's point of view."'
166
President Bush's behavior also helps demonstrate that presidents can
158. Bush Secures Taft-Hartley Court Order in Lockout, at
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutunions/ns10082002.cfm?RenderforPrint=l (last updated Jan. 9,
2003).
159. Peter G. Gosselin & James Gerstenzang, Bush's Port Action Puts Economy on the
Front Burner, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A18.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Cleeland, supra note 118.
163. Vincent J. Schodolski, Dockworkers, Shippers Reach 6-Year Pact, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
25, 2002, at 7.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
166. Gould, supra note 106, at 1483.
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use injunctions as a tool for addressing and soothing the public's legitimate
concern over the economy, which confirms the view that emergency
injunctions can be extremely useful for political gain. However, the
emergency injunction's purpose is not to gain political clout. Nevertheless,
it is nearly impossible to imagine invoking such a powerful device without
considering the amount of political clout or harm it may bring. For one
thing, defining an emergency is strikingly difficult in an academic context,
but in the political contest it is "anything so denominated by the
President."'167 "[T]he decision to declare or not to declare an emergency is
essentially political, and is as much a reflection of the incumbent
President's temperament and style as of the actual or potential economic
impact of the dispute."'
168
Before the 2002 port closure, the most recent time a President openly
considered invoking the emergency injunction was during a nationwide
strike of United Postal Service (UPS) workers, who were members of the
Teamsters Union in 1997.169 The 1997 Teamsters' strike was one of the top
media stories of the year, 70 and despite a strong push from the business
sector for President Clinton to intervene, the White House refused to
become involved. 17' Also working in the Teamsters' favor was that a
majority of the public supported the strike, and this public mood likely
affected President Clinton's decision to stay out of the dispute.
72
Although there are no available polls indicating public support of the
PMA or the ILWU, indicators of the public mood were quite prevalent and
the poor state of the economy was at the forefront of most people's minds.
Leading up to the port closure and subsequent intervention, President
Bush's references to the economy were "winning more prominent billing"
despite a month of intensive focusing on Iraq.173 A recent poll indicated
that fifty-five percent of voters identified the economy as the issue of
highest concern, as opposed to twenty-two percent who were most
concerned with the war on terrorism. 17 4 President Bush was well aware of
the public mood regarding the economy, and his behavior surrounding the
intervention indicated that his actions were meant to address the public's
167. Benjamin Aaron, National Emergency Disputes: Is There a "Final Solution"?,
1970 Wis. L. REV. 137, 140 (1970).
168. Id. at 141.
169. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 70 n.30 (citing John Carmody, The TV
Column, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1997, at C6).
170. Darryl W. Levings, '97 in Review: The Old, the New Made Their Mark, KAN. CITY
STAR, Dec. 31, 1997, at Al.
171. Leo Rennert, With Clinton's Help, Labor Bounces Back, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug.
20, 1997, at Al.
172. Id. (noting that a Gallup Poll indicated that fifty-five percent of the public supported
the Teamsters, compared to twenty-seven percent who supported UPS).
173. Gosselin & Gerstenzang, supra note 159.
174. Id.
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economic concerns, while not spending much time discussing national
security. A memorandum released after President Bush called for the
board of inquiry made only a small mention of military concerns, 75 mostly
discussing health and safety in purely economic terms. 76 When President
Bush addressed a crowd in Michigan several days after the injunction was
granted, he spoke for forty minutes, never once indicating that the
injunction protected national security, only mentioning that the injunction
would help Michigan's workers.
177
Overall, there was little public mention of national security concerns
and the case for war in Iraq, yet in the legal briefs filed in court to obtain
the injunction, the Bush administration "went to great lengths to portray the
country as effectively at war."'' 78 In doing so, the government was able to
avoid the problems that Presidents Nixon and Carter faced when seeking
their ultimately rejected injunctions. When Nixon petitioned for an
emergency injunction, the court insisted that it was insufficient to obtain an
injunction when solely economic harm is threatened. 179  Despite the
appellate court broadening the district court's definition, it nevertheless
affirmed the denial of the injunction. ° Overall, there were no connections
between Nixon and Carter's petitions for injunctions and any sort of war
effort or foreign threat to the United States or its allies. Accordingly, in
practice the state of the economy and threats to commercial interests need
to be linked to national defense.
The 2002 port closure also highlights the difficulty of defining the
"national health." Despite the fact that the term "national health" has been
defined as "the essential well-being of the economy,"'' it is still a vague
and indeterminate standard. That is, when can it be said that the essential
well-being of the American economy is threatened? There cannot be a
specific degree of inflation or level the GDP must drop to before it can be
said that the essential well-being of the economy is threatened. Rather,
much of the threat depends on how the economy is performing prior to the
labor dispute; that is, the poorer the economy is, the lesser the economic
harm resulting from a work stoppage needs to be before the essential well-
being is threatened. The concept is much more esoteric than mathematical,
requiring both a political and an economic analysis: two tasks that the
courts are unable or unwilling to partake in. Moreover, as the term is so
175. The President Takes Action to Protect America's Economy and American Jobs, The
White House Office of Communications, 2002 WL 31239930, at *2 (Oct. 7, 2002).
176. Id.
177. Remarks by the President in Michigan Welcome, The White House Office of
Communications, 2002 WL 31298843, at *6 (Oct. 14, 2002).
178. Gosselin & Gerstenzang, supra note 159.
179. See supra text accompanying note 85.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
181. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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difficult to define, the President takes a risk that his or her administration's
economic analysis may fall short in convincing the court that the essential
well-being of the economy is threatened. Yet, since there have been only
two occasions where a president failed at his gamble, history favors the
President despite the inherent risk.
Despite the limited risk that the administration faces when seeking an
emergency injunction, it is exponentially aided by the degree of time the
union or employers have to counter the government's position, and the
parrot-like nature of the boards of inquiry. 18 2 During the 2002 dispute, a
temporary restraining order ordering the ports to open was secured the day
following President Bush's executive order, which was ultimately
converted into the injunction, within one day. 18 3 The parties had less than a
day to gather any evidence to refute the government's contentions.
Moreover, neither the ILWU nor the PMA objected to any of the evidence
the government put forward, but this was not surprising, as the government
affidavits were from Cabinet-level officers, and such opinions are deemed
to be expert testimony.' 4 There was simply not enough time for the ILWU
or PMA to gather their own experts to present contradictory evidence, and
even if they could, there is no requirement that the court hear their
objections. i 5
The United States, at the time, was effectively at war with
international terrorists, 86 and the President has a wide degree of discretion
when waging war, albeit with limitations. 8 7 Justice Jackson explained in
his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube: "emergency powers
are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. 1 8  But unlike
President Truman's unconstitutional seizure of the steel mills without
statutory authority half a century ago, 8 9 President Bush's action was
perfectly legal, as the Taft-Hartley Act provided him a clear license to
intervene. There was nothing unconstitutional about President Bush's
actions; nevertheless, the events surrounding the 2002 port closure and the
182. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
183. United States v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
184. FED. R. EvID. 702.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78. Cabinet-level officers in their areas of
expertise are granted substantial deference, United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States,
361 U.S. 39, 40 (1959), and their affidavits served the purpose as if they testified in person
in the courtroom.
186. PacificMartimeAss'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
187. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (discussing the extent of the
President's power when the country is at war).
188. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
189. See id. at 587-88.
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subsequent emergency injunction are flawed policy. Yet again, private
collective bargaining negotiations were interfered with, possibly leading to
the bargaining break down, and sweeping economic and military
assessments and predictions that have often been exaggerated went
unchallenged because of the limitations on putting together a defense.
The 2002 port closure witnessed a philosophy for defining "national
safety" put forward for the first time. That is, the district court judge
accepted Secretary Rumsfeld's assertion that military and commercial
goods and supplies are so inextricably linked during the shipping and
unloading process that any work stoppage involving commercial goods and
supplies risks harming national security. 190 Consequently, there is little
doubt that the President would be willing to seek an injunction again, since
dockworkers' labor disputes almost qualify as per se threats to "national
security" under Secretary Rumsfeld's formulation. Thus, the result of the
2002 injunction may be that dockworkers have been effectively denied a
right to strike without any law being passed, usurping the will of Congress,
which chose not to enjoin particular classes of workers when the Taft-
Hartley Act was passed.' 91 Moreover, the dockworkers have not been
supplied with any substitute weapon or option to combat their employers'
economic power.
In the end, the President intervened, and fortunately the FMCS
facilitated the union and the PMA agreeing to a new six-year contract,
which was seen as a victory by both sides, without either party engaging in
any lockouts or strikes. 192  Yet, as discussed below, presidential
intervention creates a whole host of issues, and the peaceful settlement of
one dispute does not answer whether the national health or safety were
truly threatened, or whether the parties would have settled earlier.
Moreover, this peaceful settlement does not lead to the conclusion that all
settlements in the future will be peaceful. Lastly, this dispute leads to a
new threat to collective bargaining and specifically dockworkers, namely,
that "national security" may have effectively ended the dockworkers' use
of the strike.
D. What Now for the Dockworkers?
LeRoy and Johnson concluded from their research that emergency
injunctions have been a major cause in the decline of unionism and the
usage of the strike weapon, in part because the injunction "contextualizes
190. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
192. Bob Keefe, Dockworkers, Shippers Agree on Labor Contract, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Nov. 25, 2002, at A6.
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strikes as a harm to the public.' 93 After 9/11, union leaders have become
increasingly concerned that the "war on terror" could be successfully
invoked to label any future strike a "threat to national security" if it has an
adverse economic impact.9 4 There is no doubt that the unions' concerns
are real, and Secretary Rumsfeld's explanation of how commercial interests
and military interests are inextricably linked' 95 means that absent a change
in the law, the only hope for dockworkers is a president unwilling to seek
an injunction, and even more importantly, a public siding with the
dockworkers. The Sword of Damocles would always hang above the union
members' heads in the form of an imminent emergency injunction.
Knowing that a strike would be blunted, losing much of its force, as well as
the President painting the workers as harmful to the national interest, would
stop any strike before it ever began.
196
One hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the
poignant observation that "great cases are called great... because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment."'' 97 LeRoy and Johnson, using Holmes' valuable
insight, argue that "great strikes" without additional legal safeguards suffer
from the "'immediate interests' [that] will 'exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.'" 98 In other words, the
tyranny of the majority should not determine human rights standards based
merely on their immediate interests.
Obviously, the need to maintain public order and handle emergencies
in an expeditious manner may justify preventing or narrowing the right to
strike on occasion, but such laws should be narrowly tailored to minimize
the chance for abuse. The rule of law in a modern liberal democracy
should minimize the ability of a "Prince" to manipulate the public will and
the ability to make the national health or safety a proxy for political
expedience and securing the love of the people. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
was enacted to curb the "ominous precedent for the easy use of the
injunction in labor disputes."' 99 In his dissent in United Steelworkers of
America, Justice Douglas forcefully argued that the wide statutory scope
the majority gave to the emergency injunction allows it to "bludgeon all
workers merely because the labor of a few of them is needed in the interest
193. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 130, 125.
194. Bacon, supra note 121.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
196. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 130.
197. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198. LeRoy & Johnson, supra note 21, at 134 (quoting N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400-01
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
199. United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 67 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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of 'national safety. ' '' 200 Accordingly, the history of emergency injunctions
and the ability to closely align labor disputes to the "war on terror" has
likely reintroduced the mischief, which the Norris-LaGuardia Act sought to
end.
III. INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW AND THE TAFT HARTLEY EMERGENCY
INJUNCTION
This section examines the Taft-Hartley Act emergency injunction
using internationally accepted human rights principles as standards for
judgment. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), this section provides an overview of the right to strike
in light of emergencies and services required by the public. Then, the
emergency injunction is analyzed in light of the ILO jurisprudence,
concluding that the injunction falls significantly short of ILO standards.
A. The ILO and International Labor Law
The ILO is a United Nations (UN) related body with nearly universal
membership,2 1 and is the prominent source for international labor law
standards, which are a subset of international human rights law.20 2 The ILO
was founded in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles and became the first
specialized agency of the UN in 1946.03 It is useful to look to the ILO for
standards when developing a method for developing better ways to handle
national emergency disputes in the United States for two reasons. First, the
United States is a member state of the ILO, and as a member it must abide
by the obligations it has assumed. Second, the labor laws of most of the
world are based on ILO standards, 2°4 and these standards are due to the
tripartite efforts of workers' representatives, employers, and
200. Id. at 74 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
201. Lance Compa, Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States, in WORKERS'
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (James A. Gross ed., 2003). There are 191 Member States in
the United Nations, and 176 Member States of the ILO.
202. Lee Swepston, Closing the Gap between International Law and U.S. Labor Law, in
WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 53 (James A. Gross ed., 2003). The right to strike has
also been given explicit recognition in various international and regional instruments,
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 8),
the European Social Charter of 1961 (Article 6), the European Union's Community Charter
of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Article 13), the Inter-American Charter of Social
Guarantees of 1948 (Article 27), and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(Annex I, Labor Principles 1-3).
203. The International Labour Organization Mandate, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/mandate.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2000).
204. Swepston, supra note 202, at 54.
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governments.2 °5 Thus, these standards are "based on the best practice and
most recent trends in its member states, 20 6 and serve as an effective control
for assessing the standards that particular States are not yet bound.
No international labor convention or recommendation explicitly
recognizes or concerns the right to strike,20 7 however, this absence does not
mean that the ILO ignores or does not safeguard the right to strike.20 8
Rather, the right to strike has been implied from several conventions and
the ILO Constitution by the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).
This is especially relevant, because the CFA procedure is considered
legally binding by all member states of the ILO, 2°9 and other ILO bodies
have followed suit.
210
1. Jurisprudence Regarding the Right to Strike
The CFA was created in 1951 to deal with complaints of infringement
on the freedom of association, which are set forth in Convention Nos. 87
and 98.211 The CFA also relies on the ILO Constitution as an alternative to
the various ILO conventions for spelling out the principles of freedom of
22association. 212 All ratified ILO conventions are dealt with by the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR). Together these bodies have developed a
substantial jurisprudence, by scrutinizing the various conventions and the
Constitution over the past fifty years. 3
The CEARC and the CFA have had to deal with the right to strike
more often than any other subject related to labor relations.2 4 The right to
205. Compa, supra note 201, at 26.
206. Swepston, supra note 202, at 55.
207. Jane Hodges-Aeberhard & Alberto Odero de Dios, Principles of the Committee on
Freedom of Association Concerning Strikes, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 543, 543 (1987). The
right to strike has been mentioned incidentally in a convention and a recommendation. See,
e.g., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), June 25, 1957, art. 1(d) (prohibiting
the use of forced labor as punishment for striking); Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration
Recommendation (No. 92), 1951, 7 (stating that no provision may be interpreted as
limiting the right to strike).
208. Bernard Gemigon et al., ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, 137 INT'L
LAB. REv. 441, 441 (1998).
209. RUTH BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF FREEDOM TO
STRIKE 64 (1988).
210. TONIA NoviTz, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO
STRIKE 199-203 (2003).
211. BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 209, at 27-28.
212. Id. at 67.
213. Lee Swepston, Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development
through ILO Supervision, 137 INT'L LAB. REv. 169, 175-76 (1998).
214. Id. at 187.
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strike is seen as an "essential element of trade union freedoms.,, 215 It is an
"intrinsic corollary of the right of association protected by Convention No.
87.,,216 That is, the right to strike stems from the "three-dimensional" view
of freedom of association.27 First, workers must be able to organize and
aggregate their power; second, collective bargaining makes use of the
workers' aggregation of power so that they can improve their working
conditions; third, the right to strike is a "complementary freedom," without
which the other two dimensions are ineffective.2t s In over 500 cases since
1951, the CFA has relied on this "three-dimensional" approach to freedom
of association to infer the right to strike from Article 3 of Convention No.
87, which provides that "workers' [and employers'] organisations shall
have the right to organise their administration and activities and to
formulate their programmes without the interference of public
authorities. 21 9 The CEARC has come to same conclusion as the CFA
regarding the right to strike.
20
Yet, not all member states to the ILO have ratified Conventions No.
87 or No. 98, which guarantee the right to organize and collectively bargain
with adequate protection against anti-union discrimination in their
employment. Notwithstanding this fact, all member states of the ILO are
"bound to respect a certain number of principles, including the principles of
freedom of association which have become customary rules above the
Conventions., 22' The ILO Constitution also establishes principles to which
to all member states of the ILO are bound.222 Namely, among these
principles is the three-dimensional aspect of the freedom of association.223
Despite the possibility of non-ratification of Convention No. 87, the CFA
and CEARC use the standards laid out in Convention Nos. 87 and 98 as "a
yardstick to measure the fundamental principle of freedom of association
and its complimentary right to strike which were safeguarded by the ILO
215. Case No. 28 (UK-Jamaica), 2nd Report, 68 (1952).
216. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, Sess. 81, GENERAL SURVEY ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 179 (1994) [hereinafter CEACR GENERAL SURVEY].
217. BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 209, at 27.
218. Id. at 27.
219. Id. at 65.
220. See, e.g., CEACR GENERAL SURVEY 107 (1973).
221. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
GOVERNING BODY COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ANNEX I 53 (1996)
[hereinafter CFA Digest]; see also CFA Digest 1 10 ("When a State decides to become a
Member of the Organization, it accepts the fundamental principles embodied in the
Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia, including the principles of freedom of
association.").
222. CEACR GENERAL SURVEY 200 (1983); CEACR GENERAL SURVEY, supra note
216, at I 146-47; CEACR GENERAL SURVEY H 19-20 (2002).
223. BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 209, at 69.
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Constitution. 224
In conclusion, despite the absence of an explicit right to strike in any
ILO Convention, the right to strike is an essential aspect of freedom of
association. Regardless of whether a member state is a party to Convention
No. 87, the ILO Constitution is an independent source of the freedom of
association, which necessarily includes the right to strike.
2. Jurisprudence on Emergency Situations and Essential Services
The right to strike may be restricted or prohibited in essential services,
in the strict sense of the term.225 The right to strike may only be completely
prohibited in the event of an acute national emergency and for a limited
period of time.226 General prohibitions on the right to strike have a severe
impact on the "essential means" available to workers to defend their
interests, and therefore, limitations are only permissible in "genuine crisis
situations, such as those arising as a result of a serious conflict, insurrection
or natural disaster in which the normal conditions for the functioning of
society are absent. '2 7  For example, the CFA found that a general
prohibition on the right to strike imposed after an attempted coup d'dtat
against the constitutional government was justified.228 Such restrictions
and prohibitions may arise from provisions in the law or under emergency
or exceptional powers that the government invokes to justify its
intervention.229
The CEACR accepts, albeit with a degree of skepticism, "that where
industrial action could lead to an 'economic' emergency, they should be
able to prohibit recourse to industrial action., 230 The crucial question is
how severe the danger is to the national economy.' Also, long-term
restrictions on the right to strike are not permissible to achieve economic
recovery,232 because "[t]he solution to the social and economic problems of
any country cannot possibly lie in the suppression of important sections of
the trade union movement.,
233
The ILO supervisory bodies have had difficulty developing any hard
and fast rules governing categorization of a given enterprise as an essential
224. Id. at 70.
225. CFA DIGEST, supra note 221, at 526.
226. Id. at 527; CEACR GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 216, at 152.
227. CEACR GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 216, at 152.
228. Case No. 1626 (Venezuela), 284th Report, 91 (1992).
229. CEACR GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 216, at 152.
230. CEACR Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 87 (Australia) 2001.
231. Novitz, supra note 210, at 314.
232. Id. at315.
233. CFA DIGEST, supra note 221, at 31.
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service.234 The mere fact that a strike affects essential services or the public
sector will not in and of itself constitute a state of emergency.235 Services
shall only be considered "essential services in the strict sense of the term"
if their "interruption... would endanger the life, personal safety or health
of the whole or part of the population., 23 6  Moreover, a non-essential
service can turn into an essential service if a strike lasts too long or extends
to such a scope that a state of emergency develops.237 There is not a
complete list of "essential services in the strict sense of the term," because
the concept depends on the particular circumstances occurring within a
given country.238
The test for whether a given service rises to the level of essential
service, in the strict sense of the term, is whether there is an existence of a
clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety, or health of the whole
or part of the population.239 Services that may be essential services include:
the hospital sector, electricity services, water supply services, the telephone
service, and air traffic control.2 40 Services that have not been found to be
essential services, in the strict sense of the term, include: radio and
television, the petroleum sector and ports (loading and unloading), banking,
computer services for the collection of excise duties and taxes, department
stores and pleasure parks, the metal and mining sectors, transport generally,
refrigeration enterprises, hotel services, construction, automobile
manufacturing, aircraft repairs, agricultural activities, the supply and
distribution of foodstuffs, the Mint, the government printing service and the
state alcohol, salt and tobacco monopolies, the education sector,
metropolitan transport, and postal services.24
In essential services, it is consistent with the principles of freedom of
association to impose additional procedural requirements in appropriate
circumstances to temporarily restrict the freedom of association.242 All
restrictions, however, must be proportionate to the likely harms.
243
Cooling-off periods in essential services are permissible as long as they are
designed to provide time for reflection by both parties and are not contrary
to the principles of freedom of association.244 Such restrictions should be
234. Novitz, supra note 210, at 314.
235. CFA DIGEST, supra note 221, at 530.
236. Id. at T 526.
237. Id. at 541.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 540.
240. Id. at 544.
241. Id. at 1545.
242. See Novitz, supra note 210, at 310 ("Whether a restriction is compatible 'depends
on the extent to which the life of the community depends on the services involved.").
243. Id. at 313.
244. CFA Digest, supra note 221, at 505.
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complemented with "adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and
arbitration proceedings in which the parties concerned can take part at
every stage and in which the awards, once made, are fully and promptly
implemented.,, 245  Both the employers and workers concerned must
consider as impartial the members of the bodies that are entrusted with
performing such proceedings.246 Employees that are denied the right to
strike must also be provided with a corresponding denial of the right to
lockout.247 Lastly, compulsory arbitration to end a collective labor dispute
is permissible if the strike in question may be restricted or banned. 8
Otherwise, compulsory arbitration is only permissible in cases of acute
national crisis.
2 49
The CFA has stated that when a prolonged strike in a vital sector
of the economy might cause a situation in which the life, health
or personal safety of the population might be endangered, a back-
to-work order might be lawful if applied to a specific category of
staff in the event of a strike, whose scope and duration could
250cause such a situation.
Otherwise, back-to-work requirements are contrary to the principles of
freedom of association.25' Public authorities may establish a system of
minimum service to avoid irreversible or disproportionate damages, namely
damages to third parties, rather than enjoin all strike activity.252 The
establishment of minimum services is permissible and not contrary to the
freedom of association when the services in question are:
(1) services the interruption of which would endanger the life,
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population
(essential services in the strict sense of the term) ... ; (2) services
which are not essential in the strict sense of the term but where
the extent and duration of a strike might be such as to result in an
acute national crisis endangering the normal living conditions of
the population... ; and (3) in public services of fundamental
importance. 3
245. Id. at [547.
246. Id. at 549.
247. Id. at I551.
248. Id. at 1553.
249. Id. at 517.
250. Case No. 1430, (Can.), 256th Report 189 (2000).
251. Id.
252. CEACR GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 216, at 152.
253. CFA Digest, supra note 221, at 556.
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT EMERGENCY INJUNCTIONS
Unions, employers, and public authorities should be able to participate
together in defining the minimum service,254 guaranteeing that the scope of
the minimum service does not result in the strike becoming ineffective in
practice because of its limited impact. 5 This minimum service may last
for the duration of the acute national crisis endangering the normal living
conditions of the population.25 6 Finally, the decision of whether or not a
given level of minimum services is indispensable should be pronounced by
judicial authorities "in so far as it depends, in particular, upon a thorough
knowledge of the structure and functioning of the enterprises and
establishments concerned and of the real impact of the strike action.
' 251
B. Emergency Injunctions in Light of ILO Standards
The United States has not ratified either Convention No. 87 or 98;
however, it has accepted review by the CFA for complaints filed under
these Conventions. 258 Thus, the United States is only bound by those
conventions inasmuch as they reflect custom contained in the ILO
Constitution.259 More than simply addressing the United States' legal
obligations, this section proposes how American law can be adapted to 11L
standards, and consequently, more responsive to human rights concerns.
Taft-Hartley emergency injunctions are capable of prohibiting work
stoppages during acute national emergencies, as well as requiring services
that rise to the level of essential services, in the strict sense of the term, but
they also go far beyond what is permitted by ILO standards. The
availability of mediators and conciliators through the FMCS is in line with
ILO standards, as they are both independent and voluntary, 260 and can work
even better at avoiding stoppages in the first place, if the overall injunction
procedures are overhauled.
Few events rise to the level of "acute national emergency," as such
events must rise to the level of a coup d'6tat, national disaster, or siege.26'
Consequently, in these circumstances it makes the most sense for the
government to impose final-offer arbitration. Resort to arbitration in these
circumstances is permissible under LO standards,26 2 and final-offer
arbitration has been successful in public-employee disputes as well as
254. Id. at 1557.
255. Id. at 560.
256. Id. at 558.
257. ld. at$ 562.
258. Compa, supra note 201, at 28.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 52-53.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49.
2005]
336 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:2
baseball salary arbitrations.2 63 In a final-offer arbitration, both parties
provide their final offer for each contested issue, and the arbitrator selects
from one of the offers, "taking into account practices of other industries,
economic considerations, and questions of basic fairness. ' '264 Both parties
are more likely to be reasonable in an effort to have their offer selected,265
overcoming the breakdown in good faith negotiations.266  Final-offer
arbitration also permits the selection of independent arbitrators, either by
the parties or by the state most affected by the dispute, permitting
impartiality.
The language of the ILO standard of "clear and imminent threat" does
not differ much semantically from the American standard of "imperil the
national health or safety." But the mechanisms in the emergency
injunction are often disproportionate to the harm likely to result from the
strike, resulting in restrictions on the right to strike that unjustifiably harm
freedom of association. Most importantly, is the "one-size-fits-all" blanket
injunction, which result in the courts not taking account of any alternative
arguments or contradictory evidence, relying for the most part on a panel
that is hand-selected by the President.267 Creating a presumption against
granting emergency injunctions, and providing parties an effective chance
to rebut the government's evidence through the testimony of experts would
uphold the principles of freedom of association, because doing so would
allow the court to draw the boundaries of the injunction more carefully,
making all restrictions proportionate to the likely harms.
The denial of any possibility of creating an establishment of minimum
services 268 severely limits the possibility that an injunction will be
proportionate to the likely harms. This limitation is compounded by the
fact that the judiciary normally does not question the government's
position.269 By requiring minimum services to operate, and by developing
the standards for such an arrangement with the government, union, and
employers, restrictions on the right to strike can be minimized, since only
workers that are absolutely necessary to secure the public safety will be
denied the right to strike. As the PMA and ILWU demonstrated, parties in
fierce opposition can still agree to such standards.2 70 The government's
position may indeed be correct in many circumstances, but as long as it is
not rebutted or questioned, the principles of freedom of association are
unlikely to be adequately protected.
263. Gould IV, supra note 123.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See supra text accompanying note 43.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
269. Id.
270. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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The eighty-day cooling-off period also does not seem justified, as
history has demonstrated that this requirement tends to hurt bargaining
rather than create a period of calm reflection.21' ILO standards have
permitted cooling-off periods, including a forty-day period,272 but always
requiring an eighty-day period increases the likelihood that such a period is
disproportionate to the likely harms. Yet, not having a statutorily set
number of days would likely lead to a high degree of arbitrariness.
Therefore, a better approach would be to require cooling-off period of
about twenty days that can be renewed if the government can make its case,
an arrangement that would also allow the chance for rebuttal of the
government's position. When cooling-off periods are appropriate, a shorter
period of time gives the employer less time to regroup and prepare for a
strike, thus promoting more reasonable bargaining as the strike threat is
less likely to be blunted.
Overall, the rigidly and overtly discretionary nature of the Taft-
Hartley Act prevents it from being applied in a manner that is in
compliance with ILO standards. The procedures for enjoining industrial
action on the grounds of national emergency should not permit almost
unchecked presidential discretion. Applying ILO standards would place a
much greater burden on the government to justify its positions, because its
evidence and arguments would be subjected to objections and counter-
arguments, and a court would take all parties' arguments and evidence
seriously. Moreover, back-to-work orders will always be controversial, but
when such orders are made after a thorough and balanced approach that
takes account of the evidence and positions of all parties involved,
restrictions on the right to strike will be minimized, preserving the
principles of freedom of association. Lastly, the United States possesses
the machinery to accommodate these suggested changes, so there will not
be any major institutional costs of rearranging the injunction procedures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The protection of the citizenry is the most important function of
government, and in serving as the protector, the government will from time
to time justifiably limit certain specified rights. Such limitations must be
proportionate to the likely harm that the limitations seek to avoid, because
arbitrary denial of rights or disproportionate limits and derogations are
contrary to the fundamental dignity of every human, as they unjustifiably
infringe on human rights. Without adequate safeguards for protecting
human rights during times of danger or threat, a democracy can devolve
271. See supra text accompanying note 105.
272. See supra text accompanying note 244.
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into a cruel dictatorship.
The events of 9/11 have led nations to rethink how international
terrorism should be fought, and new threats to domestic tranquility demand
that governments take adequate measures to prevent such threats from
blossoming into anything further. The news and academic literature over
the past several years have emphasized various aspects of how human
rights play into the "war on terrorism," and people have engaged in debates
regarding the limits of government interference with the press, personal
records, and library holdings. Issues including the legality of preemptive
attacks, limitations on habeas petitions, immigration policy, and the very
definition of what behavior amounts to torture have garnered front-page
attention and given rise to countless academic conferences.
The right to strike also faces a threat from the post-9/11 recalibration
of human rights, because without adequate safeguards, strikes can be
enjoined all too often under the pretense of national security, providing a
president with political gain at the expense of the workers' freedom of
association. That is, the right to strike may be interfered with on security
grounds, when the real harm being avoided is the economic harm that
occurs during any strike. For this reason, the Taft-Hartley emergency
injunction, a near dinosaur of a statute which has only been successfully
invoked twice out of four attempts since 1971, needs attention.
The threats of international terrorism, the war in Iraq, and the nature
of the military supply chain, raise the specter that an emergency injunction
will never be denied under the present standards. The 2002 port-closure
demonstrated this danger, at least with respect to dockworkers. Moreover,
the standards used to invoke the injunction have never effectively balanced
the need of the public against the workers' right to strike, as injunctions
have been limited to blanket back-to-work orders and courts have never
endeavored to make injunctions proportionate to the likely harms.
Justice Douglas appears to have been correct after all, as many of his
predictions have been verified time and time again. Presently, the standard
requires courts to abandon almost all of their powers of review in light of
presidential discretion, permitting presidents to play politics with workers'
right to strike. Labor law is about balance, a balance between the rights of
workers and the rights of employers, but it also includes the rights of the
public that are affected by labor disputes. The ability to effectively prevent
dockworkers from having the right to strike is a philosophy that may be
expanded to other classes of employees. Such a philosophy must be seen
as anti-labor, as the workers are placed in a "take it or leave it" scenario for
all future contract negotiations, which exponentially strengthens the hands
of business. A pro-labor emergency strike law would provide unions a
greater ability to counter the government's experts, and the procedures
would not undermine good faith collective bargaining.
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The threat of terrorism must not be used to restrict peoples' rights
absent substantial and compelling evidence, and in the cases of certain
rights, restrictions should never be permitted. However, the right to strike
may be restricted without unjustifiably restricting workers' freedom of
association, and the ILO, through its jurisprudence, has developed
standards for justifiably restricting this important right. Interestingly, had
Justice Douglas' arguments and reasoning carried the day over a half-
century ago, the Taft-Hartley emergency injunction would likely be in
accordance with ILO standards today. The post-9/11 era has seen a large
degree of dialogue on permissible limitations on human rights, but there is
no reason why we cannot use this period to rethink all of our laws with the
goal of furthering human rights and living up to the ideals that we profess
to be securing. The Taft-Hartley emergency injunction should be replaced
by something more conducive to human rights, and the ILO standards
provide the ideal template.
